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Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are becoming part of our
lives and societies. The more decisions such systems make
for us, the more we need to ensure that the decisions they
make have a positive individual and societal ethical impact.
How can we estimate how good a system is at making eth-
ical decisions? Benchmarking is used to evaluate how good
a machine or a process performs with respect to industry
bests. In this paper we argue that (some) ethical dilemmas
can be used as benchmarks for estimating the ethical perfor-
mance of an autonomous system. We advocate that an open
source repository of such dilemmas should be maintained. We
present a prototype of such a repository available at https:
//imdb.uib.no/dilemmaz/articles/all.
Introduction
Physical and software systems are capable of making in-
formed decisions with varying degree of autonomy (Bryson
and Winfield, 2017). Examples of such systems include, but
are not limited to: driverless vehicles, assisted living tech-
nologies, algorithmic trading systems (Scopino, 2015), judi-
cial decisions analysis systems (Aletras et al., 2016), content
discovery and recommendation systems (Mobasher, Cooley,
and Srivastava, 2000). With every decision that we outsource
to an autonomous system, we also outsource the power to
control the impact that decision has on the individual lives of
people and society as a whole. With the power to have such
impact comes the responsibility to ensure the maintenance
of society’s laws and values. Machine ethics is a discipline
in artificial intelligence (AI) concerned with the issues of en-
abling autonomous intelligent systems to “behave ethically”
when operating within our society (Moor, 2006; Anderson
and Leigh Anderson, 2015; Dennis, Fisher, and Winfield,
2015; Winfield, Blum, and Liu, 2014; Charisi et al., 2017).
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The increase in number of areas in which intelligent au-
tonomous systems can be utilised calls for an increased at-
tention to the decision-making algorithms and the impli-
cations of the decisions these algorithms produce. These
decision-making algorithms must not only be correct from
an engineering standpoint, but also from an ethical one.
However, different domains of operation imply different
engineering approaches towards implementing decision-
making and reasoning, and further different choices of ethi-
cal theories and value systems that are implemented. How
under such variety can governing bodies and engineers
themselves compare and contrast the ethical reasoning ca-
pabilities of intelligent autonomous systems?
Benchmarking is the process of comparing the perfor-
mance metrics of a system to similar systems that are the
state of the art within the same industry. We can compare
two autonomous systems with respect to numerous metrics
such as: number of contexts they can operate in, speed with
which they evaluate a situation and make a decision, effi-
ciency of problem solving. In contrast, it is more difficult to
quantify and compare how ethical a system is.
Ethical behaviour, individual and social values, are all tra-
ditional topics of concern of moral philosophy (Etzioni and
Etzioni, 2017; Gert and Gert, 2017). Normative ethics in
particular is concerned with deriving theories that describe
how one ought to act. Numerous specific theories have been
developed, the most notable of which are perhaps utilitari-
anism (Harsanyi, 1977), Kantianism (Ellington, 1993), and
Ross’s ethical theory (Ross, 1930). There is no direct way in
which ethical theories can be compared. Certain actions can
be classified as morally wrong by one theory while being
morally right by another.
However, we do find that often in moral philosophy, there
are examples of decision-making scenarios that are used to
demonstrate the failures of a particular theory. These ex-
amples are called ethical dilemmas and typically consist
of comparing two options none of which is unambiguously
morally preferable to the other. One of the best known exam-
ples of an ethical dilemma is the trolley problem introduced
by Foot (1967). Can we perhaps do something similar in
machine ethics and use ethical dilemmas as a benchmark of
how ethical an intelligent autonomous system is?
Ethical dilemmas in moral philosophy embody the hard-
est of reasoning problems. Consider for instance the trol-
ley problem. There is a runaway trolley on a rail-road track.
Ahead on the track there are five people tied up, unable to
escape being killed by the trolley. The track splits into two
by a lever which can divert the trolley onto a second track
where there is one person tied up. The ethical dilemma is to
chose between diverting the train or not. This problem, as
most of the ethical dilemmas in moral philosophy is not one
that has an obvious solution.
Ethical dilemmas such as the trolley problem would not
be easier to solve for machines than they are for people, de-
spite there perhaps existing such expectations put on ma-
chines (Malle et al., 2015). For autonomous intelligent sys-
tems two other types of dilemmas can be considered that do
not exist in moral philosophy:
• cases ethically trivial for people but not for machines;
• cases that arise in autonomous systems contexts but not in
human decision-making ones.
It is rather these two classes of dilemmas that are of interest
as possible benchmarks of ethical decision-making.
In this paper we first introduce the new categories of eth-
ical dilemmas and discuss the difference with moral philos-
ophy dilemmas. We proceed to advocate that a repository
of ethical dilemmas for benchmark and testing should be
kept and we present a prototype of such a repository. Next
we analyse the different ways in which dilemmas should
be formally modelled to be available for benchmarking and
we also discuss examples of how dilemmas have been used
when developing ethical reasoning systems in related work.
Lastly we draw our conclusions and outline directions for
future work.
Ethical dilemmas for humans and machines
In moral philosophy, an ethical dilemma is an example of
a choice where different theories point to a different ethi-
cal option. There exists no consensus on a moral theory in
philosophy. We can however seek a “reflective equilibrium”
among the various existing theories to identify the unam-
biguously moral option when such an option exists. The re-
sult of an reflective equilibrium is called a considered judge-
ment (Elgin, 1996). E.g., murder is wrong, except in excep-
tional circumstances.
We consider here the three types of ethical dilemmas that
we encounter in the machine ethics literature. First are the
dilemmas from moral philosophy. Next are the dilemmas
that arise from a machine’s inability to recognise considered
judgements. Last are the dilemmas that arise in AI contexts
and that require more than recognising considered judge-
ments to be resolved.
Moral philosophy dilemmas are typically used to high-
light the shortcomings of a specific moral theory. An ex-
ample is the surgeon dilemma from (Thomson and Parent,
1986): a surgeon can save five people who need transplants
by removing the organs from a healthy person thus killing
her. From a utilitarian view point, this dilemma is identical
to the trolley problem. Act-utilitarianism resolves the trolley
problem, but the same reasoning is less acceptable for the
surgeon dilemma (Vaughn, 2014). Moral philosophy dilem-
mas are less interesting as benchmark examples because an
AI system would not be expected to compare ethical the-
ories. Such system would either develop a way to discern
ethical options, for example by machine learning, or a moral
theory will be chosen for the system by the its developers
and implemented before the system is deployed.
Common sense dilemma are problems in which a human
can easily identify an ethical choice, but a machine can-
not. An example of such a dilemma is the cake and death
dilemma considered in (Armstrong, 2015): a system has to
choose between baking a cake for its user or killing them.
Obviously, the considered judgement is that baking a cak-
ing is the ethical choice, but a machine has to “learn” or be
programmed to recognise this.
The common sense dilemmas can still be called dilem-
mas. Ethical dilemmas in its essence are problems in which
an agent has to choose between two options that are at first
instance morally equivalent. For a machine baking a cake
for the user is “morally equivalent” to killing them, unless
“taught” or “told” otherwise. The common sense dilemmas
are useful as benchmarks for determining or testing that an
implemented system is capable of basic ethical reasoning.
Machine ethics dilemmas can only arise when the
decision-maker is an artificial agent. We give an example
of one such dilemma. In recent history several terrorist at-
tacks have been executed by hijacking lorries and driving
them into groups of people. An autonomous driving system
can be used to prevent such attacks, by taking control away
from the driver when there are people in front of the vehi-
cle which would be run over if the vehicle does not change
course. However, such a feature also would make a vehicle
vulnerable to hijacking – a person or group of people only
need to stand in front of the vehicle to stop it and then pro-
ceed to overpower the driver. The driving AI system would
need to be able to decide autonomously when to take con-
trol from the driver in people-ahead situations. The solution
that the system makes, and parameters of the context it takes
into consideration to make it, are an indicator of the ethical
reasoning approach the system implements.
Unlike the common sense dilemmas that have a virtually
context-free solution, the machine ethics dilemmas can be
used as indicators of how good an artificial agent is in ethi-
cal reasoning in complex contexts. Furthermore, we can use
the machine ethics dilemmas to identify what ethical theory
or values an artificial agent implements. We cannot expect
that the implementation of an intelligent autonomous sys-
tem would be transparent, due to reasons of both usability
and industrial trade secret preservation (Charisi et al., 2017).
However, suitable benchmarks can, to a certain extent, cir-
cumvent the difficulties arising by the lack of transparency.
A prototype repository
We have created a prototype of a search engine and database
for ethical dilemmas. The necessity for such a reposi-
tory has already been argued in the engineering machine
ethics community Fisher et al. (2016) in addition to its
use as a source for benchmarking examples. The goal
of the prototype is to enable easy indexing and search-
ing through the available ethical dilemmas. The repository
of the dilemmas can be accessed on https://imdb.
uib.no/dilemmaz/articles/all, while the source
of the back-end is available on https://github.com/
Foxboron/INFO381.
To enable fast growth and searchability of the dilemma
repository we built the repository using the ElasticSearch
document-based search engine (ElasticSearch). It is based
on Apache Lucene that provides the indexing and search ca-
pabilities. ElasticSearch expands on this adding clustering,
scalability and a HTTP-based API for ease of use. It is in
the same family as other NoSQL document based databases.
It does not provide a SQL language for the user, and is not
based on the concept of schemas often found in databases.
It indexes arbitrary documents following a key value dictio-
nary structure. This allows us fast prototyping for the back-
end database. With traditional relational databases schemas
has to be defined before inserting data. This can be difficult
and increase the workload when developing a prototype. For
rapid prototyping we decided on using Python as the pro-
gramming language.
ElasticSearch provides an easy library for Python to
interact with the search engine and it operates using
JSON-structures. This conveniently allows us to refactor
the dilemmas’ format more easily until we have achieved
the desired structure for the database. We created an index
for our project, called “dilemma”, where we arranged our
documents for indexing as JSON data:
{
"title": "",
"authors": "",
"dilemma_body": "",
"article_url": "",
"logic": "",
"feature": "",
"actions": "",
"case": "",
"duty_values": ""
}
This allows us to create and model our documents without
paying attention to the underlying structure of the database.
As ElasticSearch allows everything to be indexed through
the API, we did the initial data import through scripts rather
than the manual interface.
The example query shows how a search query is per-
formed towards ElasticSearch:
GET http://localhost:9200/dilemma/_search
{
"query": {
"multi_match" : {
"query": "dilemma",
"fields": [ "title", "authors",
"dilemma_body",
"article_url", "logic", "feature",
"actions", "case", "duty_values"],
"fuzziness": "AUTO" } }
}
It lets us search across all our documents, and match text
based on the fields we want. We can then allow researchers
to search across all fields of a documents. The “fuzziness”
parameter allows our search queries to be approximated, giv-
ing us a broader ability to search across the documents. The
ElasticSearch framework abstracts away the raw HTTP calls
and lets us use Pythons own data structures. The next exam-
ple code shows all combined:
@app.route("/articles/all")
def articles_all():
e = es.search(index="dilemma",
doc_type="articles",
body={"query": {"match_all": {}}})
results = _render_hits(e["hits"]["hits"])
return
render_template('search_results.html',
results=results)
This example code queries all indexed articles and renders
them in a template displaying the results. This showcases the
terse and powerful abilities we need to be able to prototype
this application.
We also implemented an export functionality which
works as its own small API, where one can request the un-
derlying JSON representation of the ethical dilemma; the
whole repository or individual dilemmas can be exported.
The interface webpage has a simple self-explanatory de-
sign. Researchers will be faced with a display of all avail-
able dilemmas and options to either list them, index a new
dilemma or export the dataset, see Figure 1.
Figure 1: The web interface of the dilemma repository.
The machinery we implement can handle large amount of
dilemmas being stored and searched. For now we have ini-
tially populated the database with machine ethics dilemmas
that have been collected by manually searching the litera-
ture. We do intend dilemmas of all three categories to be
stored in it. Given that the dilemma examples of all three
types are dispersed over several disciplines, as well as span
different topics and contexts, it is not simple to automa-
tise the process of dilemma collection. Rather, the repos-
itory’s success and usability depend on the joint effort of
the community to grow it. The repository, its content and
back-end software are intended to be kept and evolved as an
open-source project. The code of this project is available on
Github. Anyone could in fork the project, take a copy and
continue developing the project with full history of changes,
and contribute changes back into the main code base. This
helps the growth and the improvement of the project.
Having a collection of dilemmas in natural language only
takes us part of the way towards ethical artificial agents. The
repository can also be used for researchers to store their for-
malisations of ethical problems us well, thus contributing
towards sharing results and approaches in machine ethics.
Formal representations of ethical dilemmas
Artificial agents typically reason using information repre-
sented in a formal language. While it is useful to keep a
collection of ethical dilemmas in natural language, it is also
beneficial to the machine ethics community to keep track of
the different representations of the same dilemma as well. In
this way we could hope to foster the development of a stan-
dardised representation format for ethical dilemmas relevant
to scenarios in which an AI agent might find themselves. We
begin by considering related work.
Bringsjord, Arkoudas, and Bello (2006) propose a deon-
tic logic for creating a general methodology for ethics in au-
tonomous systems. The article gives a proof of concept to
their proposed formalisation using the Murakami Axioma-
tized Deontic Logic (MADL) in an example containing au-
tonomous systems in a hospital setting. The example used
in the article involves two, what we termed, common sense
dilemmas. Two robots need to care for their patients in a
Intensive Care Unit and the robots need to ensure that pain
medication is not withheld and that a patient is not “sacri-
ficed” for their organs, in the case of the surgeon dilemma
(Thomson and Parent, 1986) which we described earlier.
Powers (2006) considers how one can use Kantian Cate-
gorical Imperatives as an ethical theory in machine ethics.
He proposes that deontological (non-consequentialist) ap-
proaches could be used together with non-monotonic rea-
soning to implement Kantian ethics, however no examples
or ethic reasoning cases are given.
McLaren (2003) presents the computational model
SIROCCO (System for Intelligent Retrieval of Opera-
tionalised Cases and Codes). The system is based on the hy-
pothesis that while ethical rules and principles are abstract,
vague and situational, when ethicists record their reasoning
as to why and how certain ethical rules were applied in cer-
tain situations what happens is that they effectively opera-
tionalise these vague and abstract ethical rules and princi-
ples. The term operationalise in this context means finding
the situational factors to a specific case, such as a person
breaking the speeding limit in order to bring a critically in-
jured person to the hospital faster is more ethical than break-
ing the speed limit because a person thinks it is fun to do so.
SIROCCO is intended to judge how to apply certain ethi-
cal principles in new situations based on past cases that are
not identical but relevant to the current case. In order for
SIROCCO to understand the ethical cases it needs to solve,
the cases are written in the Ethics Transcription Language
hereby referred to as ETL. An extended version of this lan-
guage known as Extended Ethics Transcription Language
(EETL) is used for the source base of the already known eth-
ical cases and the representation of operationalisation tech-
niques used by the system.
Bentzen (2016) proposes a formalisation for represent-
ing ethical dilemmas, or moral cases, by capturing actions,
causes, intentions, and utilities. This formalisation is used
in the HERA ethical reasoning agent for representing moral
cases (Lindner and Bentzen, 2017). A case is described us-
ing six elements: A set of action variables, a set of back-
ground variables, a set of consequence variables, a mech-
anism describing under which circumstances consequences
are true, a mapping of variables to utilities, and a mapping
from actions to intentions. A variant of the trolley problem
is represented using this formalism in (Lindner and Bentzen,
2017) using a JSON format.
Anderson and Leigh Anderson (2014) describe and imple-
ments a general ethical dilemma analyser (GenEth). Their
system “learns” to identify which of two actions is ethi-
cally preferable. They utilise Induction Logic Programming
(ILP), a machine learning technique that is able to induc-
tively learn relations represented as first-order Horn clauses
and classify negative (the first action is less ethical) and pos-
itive (the first action is more ethical) instances of pairs of
actions. The system is trained on examples of cases which
are described by their ethically relevant features as identi-
fied by ethicists. The ethically relevant features are inspired
by the prima facie duties of Ross (1930), however the sys-
tem derives its own ethical reasoning rules.
Dennis et al. (2016) develop a system in which actions are
ethically evaluated and constrained based on the prima facie
duties they violate. They use several common sense dilem-
mas to illustrate and test that the artificial agent chooses the
least unethical option.
In (Pereira and Saptawijaya, 2016, Chapter 2) a survey of
implemented systems is offered, including some we consid-
ered here, as well as their predecessors.
Unsurprisingly, there exists no consensus in the literature
on how to formalise examples of moral dilemmas. However,
we observe that overall two approaches to implementing ma-
chine ethics can be taken. Each of these approaches can be
seen as giving rise to a basic formalism for representing ethi-
cal dilemmas. The first approach is one in which an artificial
agent is trained to discern between actions with respect to
how ethical they are. The second approach implements an
selected moral theory against which the artificial agent eval-
uates her actions. These approaches to a certain extent over-
lap with what Allen, Smit, and Wallach (2005) refer to as
the bottom-up and top-down approach to artificial morality,
respectively. Some of the approaches we discussed here, like
that of (Anderson and Leigh Anderson, 2014) and (Lindner
and Bentzen, 2017) can be seen as hybrid approaches - using
an existing ethical theory to develop a new machine ethics
reasoning approach.
Training approaches to machine ethics we expect to be
reliant on machine learning methods. Ethical dilemmas here
are used as training and test data, as it was the case in the
example of (Anderson and Leigh Anderson, 2014). Here we
would need to represent ethical dilemmas using ethically rel-
evant features1.
We can assume and observe in current examples that ap-
proaches that implement a chosen moral theory are con-
structed as logic-based reasoning systems. Here, ethical
dilemmas serve the purpose of background knowledge. The
ethical dilemmas are most usefully described as logic for-
mulas with special logic constructs that indicate obligations,
permissions, prohibitions, ethical principles, ethical prefer-
ences, etc.
Each specific implemented machine ethics system would
naturally develop their own formalisation for data or knowl-
edge, however the question is whether there is room to con-
sider a basic formalisation for ethical dilemmas that can eas-
ily be modified to suit the need of a specific system. In what
follows we make an attempt for such basic formalisation that
is based on prima facie duties. We chose this approach as
we encounter prima facie duties in several of of the imple-
mented systems: (Lindner and Bentzen, 2017), Dennis et al.
(2016), Anderson and Leigh Anderson (2014) and even to
some extent Bringsjord, Arkoudas, and Bello (2006). Duties
and principles are also the core of ethical behaviour guide-
lines developed to govern professional conduct, such as for
example in biomedical professions (Beauchamp and Chil-
dress, 1979).
Formalisations based on prima facie duties
Prima facie duty is, according to Ross (1930), a “way to re-
fer to an act’s characteristics, and what kind of act it is.”
There exists at least seven such duties according to Ross
(1930): duties of fidelity, duties of reparations, duties of grat-
itude, duties of justice, duties of beneficence, duties of self
improvement, and duties of harm-prevention. Garrett (2004)
also proposes other duties, but he argues that some of them
might implicitly fall in under Ross’ other duties. One of
these additional duties are the duty of respect for freedom,
or autonomy.
We show how an ethical dilemma can be represented with
respect to the prima facie relevant duties. We do not argue
that this is the best representation or even the mos functional
one. Our aim is to demonstrate that a general representation
of ethical dilemmas for both learning and logic-reasoning
approaches is feasible. We assume that a dilemma is given
as to offer a choice of two possible actions, with the problem
being of identifying the more ethical of the two.
For using ethical dilemmas as data sets for training and
testing we use ethically relevant features that stem from a
prima facie duty-value set following the approach of Ander-
son and Leigh Anderson (2014). Each action in a dilemma
is represented using a tuple of values, one value for each
feature. We consider an extended list of prima facie duty
inspired features, generalising the list of (Anderson and
Leigh Anderson, 2014) and(Anderson and Leigh Anderson,
2007). We have not included all of Ross’ duties, but we have
1To the best of our knowledge, deep learning methods are yet to
be deployed for machine ethics applications. If and when they are
used, they would extract the relevant features in ethical dilemmas
which may or may not turn out to be the ethically relevant features.
modified some of the duties and added some others that are
more relevant to autonomous artificial agents. In our fea-
tures, we have split the duty of harm-prevention into five
categories that discern prevention of harm to the user/owner,
people, animals, property and harm caused by external fac-
tors. We included the respect for privacy and a slight vari-
ant of the duty of respect for freedom. Our duty of respect
for freedom is adjusted to be more fitting to describe the
autonomy-relation between the user and the autonomous
agent, calling it respect for a user’s autonomy. The user’s
autonomy is affected by whether the agent makes a pater-
nalistic decision on behalf of the user, minimising the users
autonomy (Millar, 2016). Thus our list of features is, in or-
der: (f1) causes harm to owner/user, (f2) causes harm to a
person, (f3) causes harm to an animal, (f4) causes harm to
property, (f5) allows harm to be inflicted by external fac-
tors, (f6) violates autonomy, (f7) violates fidelity and truth
telling, and (f8) violates privacy. A positive value for a fea-
ture indicates that an action has that feature. Negative values
can be used to compare actions by how much they do not
posses a feature, however we here limit ourselves to using 0
for absence of features.
For using ethical dilemmas as tests for validating logic-
based ethical reasoning we propose that ethical dilemmas
are formalised using a syntax that resembles that of Prolog
(Gallier, 2015). Prolog is a very good candidate for this task
because it is expressive, as a a subset of First-Order Pred-
icate Logic it allows for modal logics to be expressed in it
to a reasonable extent, but also it is arguably the most used
logic programming language.
In Prolog syntax, the eight prima facie duty inspired fea-
tures we described can be formalised as constants f1-f2.
We can then use them as features or consequence of actions.
Thus a predicate feature(f8, camera on) can be used to in-
dicate that turning the camera on caused or constitutes a vi-
olation of the duty to observe privacy. We use the Tunnel
dilemma of (Millar, 2016) to illustrate our two simple for-
malisations.
Example – Tunnel dilemma. Sarah is travelling along a
single-lane mountain road in an autonomous car that is fast
approaching a narrow tunnel. Just before entering the tunnel
a child errantly runs into the road and trips in the centre of
the lane, effectively blocking the entrance to the tunnel. The
car is unable to brake in time to avoid a crash. It has but
two options: hit and kill the child; or swerve into the wall on
either side of the tunnel, thus killing Sarah.
We give a Prolog formalisation. The following predicates
describe the facts of the dilemma and the car’s options:
person(sarah). passenger(sarah, car).
person(child). type(road, mountain).
type(road, narrow). quantity(road, lane, 1).
at_location(car, entrance, tunnel).
at_location(child, entrance, tunnel).
can_do(car, drive_straight).
can_do(car, drive_left).
can_do(car, drive_right).
We can describe what happens when the car takes each of
the actions with the following rules:
do(car, drive_left), quantity(road, lane, 1),
type(road, narrow),type(road,mountain)
:-do(car, hit_wall).
do(car, drive_right), quantity(road, lane, 1),
type(road, narrow), type(road, mountain)
:- do(car, hit_wall).
do(car, hit_wall), passenger(X, car):-
violates(hit_wall, f1).
do(car, drive_straight),
at_location(child, entrance, tunnel)
:- violates(drive_straight, f2).
The system can reason about which is the best action
when there it has a formalisation of an ethical theory.
The actions in the same dilemma, drive straight or swerve
can each be represented with tuples (we use just binary val-
ues here with one indicating presence of a feature):
drive straight (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0,)
swerve into tunnel side (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
The action of running through the tunnel has the feature of
causing harm to people, because it kills the child. The action
of swerving into the tunnel has the feature of causing harm
to owner and also causing harm to property. Both actions vi-
olate the autonomy of the user, by taking control away from
it in making a choice.
Conclusions
Dilemmas in ethics have a long tradition as tools for illustrat-
ing the shortcomings of an ethical theory, but also for high-
lighting the differences between theories. We argued that if
dilemmas are seen as cases in which one has to choose be-
tween two morally equivalent or ambiguous choices, then
we can consider three types of ethical dilemmas: philoso-
phy dilemmas, common sense dilemmas and machine ethics
dilemmas. We propose that dilemmas, in particular the lat-
ter two types, can be used as benchmarks for implemented
ethical decision-making systems. Common sense dilemmas
can be used as tests to show that basic ethical distinction can
be made between actions, while machine ethics dilemmas
and moral philosophy dilemmas can be used to showcase
the advanced ethic capabilities of an AI system. We advocate
the construction and maintenance of a dilemma repository,
to foster building a benchmarking standard in the machine
ethics community.
This work makes a modest contribution towards starting
and promoting a community resource. Due to the lack of
any sort of collection that contains different ethical dilem-
mas, there are significant advantages to creating one. Apart
from the benchmarks, the repository can be used to advance
research and development in machine ethics. A systemat-
ically structured collection like the one we aim to foster
could also make dilemmas and examples more accessible
to researchers that are newly entering the field of machine
ethics. Developers of ethical reasoning systems can use the
dilemma repository to also learn which examples, formali-
sation and context have been considered so far in the liter-
ature. This information is otherwise not easy to attain since
the machine ethics literature is dispersed across several dis-
ciplines. By adapting and transforming existing formal lan-
guages or feature representations, we can, as a community,
faster develop a standard for implementing machine ethical
reasoning and decision-making systems.
We have to address the limitations of our repository so-
lution which also outline directions for future work. First,
the nature of the prototype as an open source platform re-
quires user participation to ensure its success. The system
can only function so long as there are users to input and
extract dilemmas from the database. This creates a situation
where the entire development and promotion of the system is
very relevant to its existence. Another related concern is that
the community of researchers within the field of machine
ethics is relatively small, which further adds to the impor-
tance of how we approach the users of this database. Upon
encountering the system for the first time, its features and
functionality should be immediately discernible to the user
before they interact with it or try to register new dilemmas.
Otherwise we risk unwanted or badly described dilemmas in
the database that could weaken the integrity of the collection
itself.
Since the enumerated are important criteria for the suc-
cess of this resource, we need to find ways to avoid misuse
of the system. With misuse we mean that there is a possi-
bility for users to add duplicates of a dilemma,or add some-
thing that does not qualify to be considered as a dilemma.
A badly described dilemma or an incomplete explanation
of one could also be considered misuse. The system is at
present not able to automatically check whether a duplicate
of a dilemma has been entered and it needs to be main-
tained by a moderator. In the future we would like to in-
crease the system’s “autonomy” by including a natural lan-
guage checker that could comb through the entered text and
gauge the relevance of the added dilemma compared to the
existing dilemmas.
Lastly, we might also want to enable user accounts for
tracking a user’s activity within the database. Validation
of the accounts would help certify legitimate contributions
and avoid contributions from untrustworthy or illegitimate
sources. This would help protect the repository from corrup-
tions and also ensure its credibility.
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